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The UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) present a formidable funding challenge.
Financial innovation is one way through which resources can be secured, while also pro-
viding business opportunities for market actors. The insurance sector, in particular, has
been at the forefront of such innovation, developing financial instruments to manage the
flooding, fire, and stormrisks that characterize an increasinglyunstableworld.Weexamine
one such financial instrument—the catastrophe bond—which transfers extreme risk from
insurers and reinsurers to capital markets. Using a comprehensive database of all catas-
trophe bonds issued through March 2016, we find that the modeling which underlies ca-
tastrophe bonds is not demonstrably better than guesswork at predicting the financial
consequences of extreme events. Moreover, secondary data reveal that market actors are
under no illusions about the level of precision and accuracy provided by the models. Our
analysis suggests that catastrophe bonds do not lend themselves to analysis through con-
ventional sociological theories of financial markets. Drawing on theories of ignorance, we
reflect on the social arrangements that sustain financial markets in contexts of extreme
uncertainty. We conclude with some cautionary notes for harnessing financial tools in
support of the SDGs.
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The sustainable development goals (SDGs) are re-
markable for their audacity. Their implications for
how we construct our lives, our economies, our soci-
eties, and our relationship with nature cannot be
overstated. Of course, to attain a set of goals so trans-
formative, many systemic changes are required, in-
volving governance, technology, culture, and belief
systems. Not least, their implementation requires vast
sums of money. The effort required to mitigate envi-
ronmental harms and reduce social disparities while
at the same time adapting to an increasingly unstable
planetary system requires an almost unimaginable
amountof resources.One report by theUnitedNations
pegs the required annual investment at $5–7 trillion
(UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2014).
Given that pursuit of the SDGs will require in-
vestment on a scale unlike any in human history, it is
not surprising that they can be construed as a huge
opportunity for business: a means to provide society
the products and services required to transition to
sustainability (Business and Sustainable Development
Commission, 2017; DNV GL, UN Global Compact, &
Sustainia, 2018; GRI, UN Global Compact, & WBCSD,
2015). Indeed,with business an increasinglydominant
player in the world order, it is not unreasonable to as-
sume or expect the for-profit sector to harness its
problem-solving skills to tackle the SDGs. Of course,
harnessing private enterprise to thismission requires a
promise of financial viability, if not outright profit-
ability. Managerial concepts such as “shared value”
(Porter & Kramer, 2011) and the “bottom of the pyra-
mid” (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Prahalad, 2006) epit-
omize the notion that corporations can and should
prosper by better serving the needs of society.
Recognizing the opportunity for private enterprise to
make meaningful contributions to the SDGs and the
need to mobilize large amounts of capital, a variety of
actors are actively devising and implementing new fi-
nancial tools and models that seek to integrate sus-
tainability and profitability. The use of financial
innovation to attain the SDGs is already manifested
throughmicro finance (Yunus,1999)andmobilephone
applications that promote financial inclusivity (Suri,
2017), through the development of “green” and “social
impact” bonds to promote private sector investment
into public goods (Khalamayzer, 2017; Warner, 2013),
and through the development of markets for the pres-
ervation of biodiversity, in which dollar values are
assigned to the preservation of species and ecosystems
(Costello, Gaines, &Gerber, 2012; Foale, Dyer, &Kinch,
2016). These forms of innovation are, however, con-
tentious and polarizing. Empirical questions about
their effectiveness abound (Bateman & Chang, 2012;
Popper, 2015), as domore fundamental concerns about
their normative underpinnings and consequences for
howwe value and safeguard “priceless” goods such as
robust societies and flourishing ecosystems (Ackerman
&Heinzerling,2004;Knox-Hayes,2015;Monbiot,2018;
Sandel, 2013). This debate questionswhether financial
innovation can be trusted to serve the public good. Or,
more generally, in which contexts should we rely on
innovative financial products to address the difficult
and unprecedented challenges of unsustainability?
We explore this question by analyzing a form of fi-
nancial engineering that has been embraced by the
insurance industry in response to the increasing fre-
quencyof extreme—andcostly—naturaldisasters such
as flooding and forest fires. Traditionally, insurance
companies have dealt with extreme risk through rein-
surance—essentially insuring themselves with other,
larger insurers, who can spread risk among various
geographies and peril types (Jarzabkowski, Bednarek,
& Spee, 2015). But, in the last two decades, claims
resulting from extreme events increased substantially
(see Figure 1), threatening the viability of the insurance
industry as awhole.Oneway inwhich the industryhas
addressed this threat is by developing new financial
products, with the goal of attracting additional capital
and diversifying risk to other markets (Culp, 2006).
One of these products is the catastrophe bond: a fi-
nancial tool that provides the issuer, usually an insur-
ance or reinsurance company, a payout in case of a
catastrophe, such as a hurricane. These bonds, sold to
institutional investors, allow insurers to mitigate ex-
treme risk: in case of a catastrophe strong enough to
“trigger” thebond, insurers access the investors’ capital
anddistribute it to claimants.Rather than relyingon the
traditional reinsurancemarket, catastrophe bonds offer
insurers access to capital from financial entities such as
pensions and hedge funds, who often seek to diversify
their portfolio risk through investments that are un-
correlatedwith thebroader financialmarket. Likeother
forms of financial innovation related to the SDGs, ca-
tastrophe bonds garner support from a number of par-
ties—not only from financial actors such as investors,
insurance and reinsurance companies, and the World
Bank (Harding, 2014) but also from regulators that are
otherwise insurers of last resort when catastrophe
strikes (Association of British Insurers, 2005; Dickson,
2013), andenvironmental activistswhoconstantly seek
novel ways to promote sustainability (Cleetus, 2013;
Linnenluecke, Smith, &McKnight, 2016; UNEP, 2013).
Notwithstanding this support from a diverse set of
stakeholders, the viability of using economic and fi-
nancial tools for coping and adapting to greater in-
stability in a rapidly warming world warrants scrutiny.
Anassessment of the effectiveness of catastrophebonds
requires a thorough exploration of the modeling work
that underpins them. We proceed by examining these
models via the two primary theoretical lenses through
which financialmarkets have been conceptualized—the
camera and the engine. Theorizing markets as cameras
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equates them to passive recorders of value; theorizing
markets as engines assigns them greater agency and
acknowledges their power to themselves creating
change in theworld (MacKenzie, 2006).We findneither
of these lenses satisfactory forunderstandingvaluations
in the catastrophe bond market. Specifically, our ana-
lyses suggest that catastrophe models are not accurate:
they systematicallyoverestimate risk anddonotpredict
better than guesswork. Thus, they are not cameras. At
the same time, unlike derivative pricing models, e.g.,
they are not logically derived from economic frame-
works and do not appear to drive market behavior and
perceptions of value toward theoretically informed
levels. They are, therefore, not engines.
Our data and analyses lead us to suggest that the
accuracy of catastrophe models is indeterminate. We
highlight this indeterminacy by making several se-
quential assertions. First, we demonstrate how un-
certainty is ingrained in the risk models that underlie
catastrophe bonds and show that this uncertainty is
unavoidably large. Next, we establish that the cumu-
lative predictive power of all catastrophe bonds over
thepast twodecadeshasbeen less accurate thanwould
have been generated by guesswork. We then show
that the yields that catastrophe bonds provide are
determined primarily not by the odds of their being
triggered but rather by exogenous factors, namely,
macroeconomic conditions, liquidity in the insurance
industry, and investor demand. Together, these find-
ings suggest that the financial value of catastrophe
bonds is only loosely associated with the catastrophe
coverage they provide. We also find that to date, on
aggregate, catastrophe bonds have been consistently
profitable for the financial entities that have invested
in them. Nonetheless, the models are not or—more
accurately—cannot be proven wrong or biased in any
strict sense of the word. Given this conclusion, we
speculate about the social arrangements that might
maintain and support financial instruments that are
highly uncertain and whose value is largely unknow-
able, and discuss the implications of using these tools
to promote the sustainable development goals.
RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Global economic elites often frame sustainability as a
risk management problem and emphasize that com-
prehending and addressing risk is eminently prudent.
For example, Michael Bloomberg, Former Treasury
Secretary Hank Paulson, and venture capitalist Tom
Steyer established and lead a coalition called the “Risky
Business Project,” which contends that “the economic
risks from unmitigated climate change to American
businesses and long-term investors are large and un-
acceptable” (Risky Business Project, 2016: 88). The
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WorldEconomicForumhas long embraced the framing
of sustainability through risk. In early 2019, it issued its
14th annual Global Risks Report in the run-up to the
2019Davosmeeting.The topthreerisks identified in the
report are environmental. In order, they are extreme
weather events, failure of climate change mitigation
and adaptation, and natural disasters (World Economic
Forum, 2019). Relatedly, 10 of the 17 SDGs have been
identified as salient to disaster risk reduction (UN
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015).
The loss of life and property from natural catastro-
phes is of course critical. Indeed, the disruption caused
by such events is so severe that one of the largest sectors
in the global economy—the insurance industry—
specializes in managing these risks, and in doing so
provides an important service to society. According to
Michael Bloomberg, who serves as UN Special Envoy
for Climate Action, “the more insurers understand cli-
mate risks facing the economy, themore they canmake
prudent decisions in managing risk and serving their
clients, and the more efficient and stable our markets
will become” (UNEP FI, 2018). The global insurance
sector has constructively engaged with the United
Nations todevelopPrinciples for Sustainable Insurance
(https://www.unepfi.org/psi/the-principles/). Through
these principles, many of the world’s largest insurers
have committed to work with governments, regulators,
and other stakeholders to develop insurance solutions
in linewith theSDGs (Jaeggi, 2015). Theunitwithin the
UN that manages the partnership with the insurance
sector is the UN Environment Programme - Finance
Initiative (UNEP FI), a partnership with more than 230
financial institutions dedicated to promoting “sustain-
able finance” (https://www.unepfi.org/about/structure/).
Devising insurance solutions for a destabilizing
world is a challenging endeavor, far removed from
the ubiquitous retail products that constitute part of
our everyday lives. The “bread and butter” services
provided by insurance companies allow people and
organizations to safeguard themselves against un-
fortunate yet limited events suchasproperty loss and
personal injury. Usually, events like these occur
sporadically and in a randomly (temporally and
geographically) distributed fashion. For insurance to
be viable, an insurance company insures a large num-
ber of people, whose risk profiles are essentially un-
correlated (Denuit, Dhaene, Goovaerts, & Kaas, 2015).
Certain types of events are generally quite predict-
able, and claims are, in fact, unlikely to be correlated.A
good example is life insurance. Life expectancy statis-
tics are used to develop actuarial tables, based on very
large sample sizes, yielding high statistical power.
Moreover, the death of one individual will, in most
cases, be statistically independent of thedeathsof other
individuals, so that the insurance payouts following
deaths are randomly dispersed. Predictability and low
correlation thus reduce risk when large numbers of
individuals are pooled together via insurance.As such,
the businessmodel of successful insurance is based on
an incomestream that originateswith client premiums.
Because of the law of large numbers, the likelihood of
claims (expenditures) rising beyond income is small,
albeit not zero.
Not all types of insurance, however, have these
convenient statistical characteristics. For example, the
population size might be small, as in the case of mari-
time insurance—the insurance of shipping vessels—a
class of insurance that has been portrayed as akin to
voodoo, in that it harnesses tacit knowledge shared
within closed epistemic communities (Jarzabkowski
et al., 2015). Extreme weather and natural disaster in-
surance are even more challenging. Forest fires and
weather-induced flooding can affect an entire region,
creating a large number of claimants at the same time,
thereby violating statistical independence. Because
insurers tend to be rather nondiversified in terms of the
risk coverage they offer and the geography in which
they operate, a large event such as a flood or a fire
can lead to a spike in payouts, leading to insolvency
(Gründl, Dong, & Gal, 2017).
Insuring Rare Events
“[New York] has a 100-year flood every two
years now.”
(Gov. Andrew Cuomo, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Sandy, as cited in UPI, 2012).
As Governor Cuomo’s pronouncement suggests,
when it comes to rare events, our intellectual capac-
ities may be challenged. Gov. Cuomo expressed this
sentiment after witnessing the havoc of Hurricane
Sandy in his state. Sandy hit New York in October
2012, 14 months after Hurricane Irene—itself at the
time the seventh costliest hurricane in the U.S. his-
tory—and left in its wake extensive damage, most
notably to New York City. At face value, Gov.
Cuomo’s statement seems toderide the validity of risk
models that claim that extreme weather events are
rare, if they take place in rapid succession. Yet, at the
same time, there is nothing inherently implausible
about the statement either and not one that risk
modelers would dispute. Just as a gambler can get a
lucky streak at the roulette table, so too can several
infrequent weather events occur in close succession
without discrediting the validity of the statistical
model that predicts them.
Gov. Cuomo, one might assume, is not only inter-
ested in theepistemological ruminations thatarise from
contemplating extremeweather events but also in their
costs. These concerns are even more acute for in-
surance companies the world over, particularly as the
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climate changes, and “peak perils” increase (Willis
CapitalMarkets &Advisory, 2015). Over the past years,
insurers have understood that adaptation to increasing
environmental instability is a cardinal concern for their
long-term survival. Put simply, insurance companies
can remain viable only to the extent that they can ac-
curately assess and price the risk they assume. As cli-
matechange intensifies,more large-scaleeventssuchas
droughts, floods, and hurricanes occur (Coumou &
Rahmstorf, 2012). These events also become more in-
tense, creating greatermortality andproperty damages,
which, if insured, raise payouts. The heightened in-
tensity of extreme weather events makes them histori-
cally unique, with few or no historical precedents.
Consequently, the expected monetary consequences
of the damage they are likely to cause is difficult to
predict (Pielke Jr., Gratz, Landsea, Collins, Saunders, &
Musulin, 2008). This is the crux of the problem facing
insurers that seek to fulfill the principles of sustainable
investment and contribute to addressing the SDGs.
RESEARCH SETTING: CATASTROPHE BONDS
To mitigate extreme risk, insurance companies
have traditionally insured themselves with compa-
nies known as reinsurers. Reinsurers spread risk by
providing greater diversification than insurers can
generate internally. They do so by covering insurers
with different domains of coverage and in different
geographies. The appeal of reinsuring is to pass on
the risk of a particularly extreme event to another
entity better structured to accommodate it.
Another tool that insurers can use to manage rare
risks is catastrophe bonds. Catastrophe bonds offer the
same functionality of risk transfer as reinsurance, with
one major difference: they transfer extreme risk not
to reinsurers but to other financial actors instead.
Catastrophe bonds were devised in the mid-1990s, in
the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew—at that time, the
most costly hurricane in the U.S. history, totaling $15
billion—and the Northridge Earthquake, events of
such magnitude that the insurance industry began to
look for complementary mechanisms to manage risks.
Insurers recognized that catastrophic events such as
these could make reinsurance exorbitantly expensive,
and that spreading risk evenmore widely, to financial
entities outside the insurance sector, could lower costs
and attract more capital. In effect, catastrophe bonds
were devised to spread insurance risk to qualified in-
vestors outside the insurance sector.
A catastrophe bond is thus a financial tool that pro-
vides the issuer (most frequently an insurer or a re-
insurer) protection in case of a major catastrophe,
usually an extreme natural catastrophe such as a hur-
ricane or an earthquake. Catastrophe bonds are very
specific in terms of the coverage they provide, and a
prospectus typically runs to several hundred pages.
The bonds can be triggered in several ways. For in-
stance, one could be triggered if an earthquake of a
minimum magnitude of 7.5 occurred in a delimited
region on the U.S. West Coast within the next three
years. Or it could be triggered only after the payouts by
the insurer or reinsurer (the “cedent” or “sponsor” of
the bond) following the catastrophe exceeds a certain
predefined dollar threshold (for a thorough overview,
see Cummins & Weiss, 2009). Catastrophe bond cov-
erage typically extends to tens or hundreds of millions
of dollars, very rarely exceeding $500 million. Like
conventional reinsurance agreements, catastrophe
bonds provide coverage for a “layer,” or “tranche” of
risk, e.g., to cover the losses incurredby the cedent after
the first $2 billion in payouts, up until $2.3 billion in
payouts, in such manner diversifying the sources of
revenue to be tapped following an extreme event.
Therefore, even when disaster strikes in a region cov-
ered by a bond, it may not be triggered.
From an investors’ perspective, catastrophe bonds
are attractive because they present a unique in-
vestment opportunity that is uncorrelated to finan-
cial markets. They are thus a useful asset class for
diversifying risk in an investor’s portfolio. This
characteristic makes catastrophe bonds especially
appealing to institutional investors, by providing not
only attractive returns but also a way of addressing
the most pernicious of financial risks: global sys-
temic risk (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, &
Windawi, 2015) or the risk that originates from the
tight interlinkages between all sectors of the world
economy. Put simply, it is hard to find an investment
vehicle less dependent on the health of global fi-
nancial markets than an earthquake. Indeed,
whereas virtually the entire financial system col-
lapsed in 2008, the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond
Performance Index2 actually rose by 2.5 percent
(Johnson, 2013). Catastrophe bonds in the United
States returned 22 percent between 2012 and 2014,
roughly equivalent to the returns from corporate
junk bonds, during a period that included damage
caused by Hurricane Sandy (Chen, 2014). These
rates of return have drawn in many new investors
over the past decade, ranging from pension funds to
sovereign funds to hedge funds. The total catastro-
phe bonds on-risk reached $33 billion as of year-end
2 The index is a market value–weighted basket of natural
catastrophe bonds tracked by reinsurer Swiss Re’s Capital
Markets division. Launched in 2007, it is today the point of
reference for cat bond sector returns. The index tracks the per-
formance of all catastrophe bonds issued, denominated in any
currency, unrated or rated. See https://www.swissre.
com/Library/swiss-re-cat-bond-indices-methodology.html for
more details.
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2017, roughly 6 percent of the $600 billion global
reinsurance market (Artemis, 2018).
Catastrophe bonds are customarily structured as
private placements (Boyer & Dupont-Courtade, 2015),
meaning that investors like pension funds and sover-
eign wealth funds are approached privately, bymeans
of a roadshow,where the issuer,possiblyaccompanied
by thecatastrophemodelingagent (see in the following
text), introduces the bond, answers questions, and
gauges potential investors’ interest in the offering. By
the end of the roadshow, final details have been
worked out, a price has been finalized, and the bond
has been sold to qualified investors (Lalonde &
Karsenti, 2008). Once a deal is finalized, the principal
is placed in a special purpose vehicle, or SPV, a legal
entity set up solely for managing the money raised by
thebond (seeFigure2).Before the2008 financial crisis,
SPVs often invested the principal in various channels,
but following four catastrophe bond defaults that en-
sued fromtheLehmanBrothersbankruptcy,SPVsnow
have much stricter collateral arrangements, keeping
their holdings inU.S. TreasuryBills or similar low-risk
investments. If the covered natural catastrophe occurs
during the risk period, part or all of themoney from the
SPVis transferred to thecedent tocover their insurance
losses.Otherwise, atmaturity, theprincipal is returned
to the investor. Throughout the duration of the bond,
the investor receives coupon payments as specified in
theprospectus.Thecash flowfor thecouponpayments
originates from premiums of insured clients, collected
by the cedent.
In effect, catastrophe bonds have a similar struc-
ture to other “quasi-bonds” available to institutional
investors, such as mortgage-backed securities and
collateralized debt obligations (Vinokurova, 2012).
This structure is appealing to investors and issuers
because it accommodates lower regulatory capital
requirements, and thus can be highly leveraged. Like
other complex quasi-bonds, catastrophe bond trad-
ing takes place only between specialized financial
experts who pore over lengthy prospectuses and in-
tricate computer models before striking a deal.
Catastrophe Models
As our lengthy description highlights, catastrophe
bonds are intricately constructed financial arrange-
ments. And yet, they are often perceived as rather
straightforward.Abroker interviewedbyHintze (2013)
explained: “When I talk to people involved in the
commercial mortgage-backed securities market, they
practically laugh at how simple cat bonds are.”
However, theyareperceived tobe simplebecause their
logic is straightforward, rather than because risk can
accurately be assessed. Indeed, others disagree that
the products are simple and shun catastrophe bond
offerings because they are described in prospectuses
that are “telephone book-thick” (Stovin-Bradford,
2015). At the heart of these telephone book-thick doc-
uments lie catastrophe risk models.
Because natural catastrophes are rare and unpre-
dictable,actuarial tablesareof limitedvalue fordivining
the risk of extreme events (Cabantous & Dupont-
Courtade, 2015). Instead, quantification of risk is per-
formed through a process known as catastrophe risk
modeling. Thesemodels are conceptually distinct from
actuarial tables because they are not based on large
statistical samples. Instead, catastrophe models use
mathematical formulas and stylized simplifications of
natural phenomena to run simulations that mimic real-
world scenarios. Themodels are empirically calibrated,
yet the amount of historical data that can be used is
limited by the number of rare events recorded.
Three specialized companies—RMS, CoreLogic
(formerly EQECAT), and AIR—provide most catastro-
phe risk models in use in the insurance industry
(Grossi & Kunreuther, 2005). These models have three
components (Clark, 2002). First, a hazard model har-
nesses expertise in meteorology, climatology, ocean-
ography, geophysics, and other natural sciences to
predict the incidence and intensity of catastrophic
events. Then, damage models use techniques from
civil engineering to predict how buildings and in-
frastructure will fare in extreme conditions. Finally,
loss models are economic models that forecast the
cost of repairing damages, as well as indirect losses
such as business interruption and relocation costs.
Catastrophe risk models run these components se-
quentially and generate thousands of simulated sce-
narios (Muir-Wood, 2016). Models are validated
using historical data by assessing whether model
outputs for events similar to those in the historical
record in fact yield damage and loss predictions that
correspond to those incurred in actual events (Pielke
Jr., Landsea, Musulin, & Downton, 1999). Each of
these steps is consummately professional and har-
nesses state-of-the art knowledge. Indeed, all of the
modeling companies have dozens of PhDs onpayroll,
across an array of disciplines. Catastrophemodels are
widely available and are used by both buyers and
sellers. Consequently, the market for catastrophe risk
does not suffer from endemic information asymmetries.
DATA
We compiled a comprehensive list of all catastrophe
bonds issued fromthe inceptionof thecatastrophebond
market in December 1996, until March 2016. Publicly
available data on catastrophe bonds are scarce, and
most transactions take place over the counter rather
than via exchanges. Therefore, we obtained proprietary
comprehensive data synthesized in the Artemis Deal
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Directory (www.artemis.bm), similar to the datasets
used by insurance researchers examining catastrophe
bonds (e.g.,Braun,2016;Gürtler,Hibbeln,&Winkelvos,
2016). Like mortgage-backed securities and other fi-
nancial instruments, catastrophe bonds are often struc-
tured in tranches, which provide several layers of risk
and reward within the same deal. In total, our dataset
comprised 612 tranches within 383 deals.
For each tranche,weobtained the followingprimary
information: the name of the cedent (sponsor), its size
(in millions of US dollars), its date of issue, and its
duration. In particular, we noted the probabilities of
attachment (the likelihood for a bond to be triggered, as
specified in the prospectus) and exhaustion (the like-
lihood for a bond’s principal to be transferred in its
entirety to the cedent, again as specified in the pro-
spectus). Perhaps, the most important metric in the
catastrophe bond market is the expected loss, defined
as “the average loss that investors can expect to incur
over the course of a period (usually one year) divided
by the principal amount invested” (Willis Capital
Markets & Advisory, 2015). We also calculated the
spread for each tranche, specifically the difference
between the coupon and the risk-free interest rate in
the form of the U.S. Treasury spot curve.
To put catastrophe bond coupons in economic con-
text, we followed the recent literature in insurance
economics (Braun, 2016) and captured the influence of
the corporate bond market on catastrophe bonds—and
particularly the effects of speculative grade bonds rated
similarly to catastrophe bonds—via the Bank of
America Merrill Lynch U.S. High Yield BB Option-
Adjusted Spread. This measure is calculated as the
difference between a yield index for the BB rating cat-
egory and the Treasury spot curve.3
Major natural disasters greatly affect insurance
markets. Born and Viscusi (2006) called such events
“blockbuster catastrophes” and showed that they
have direct economic consequences in terms of
subsequent premiums and willingness to take on
risk. We thus collected information on the 10 “de-
fault events” since 1998—the events that caused
capital losses to catastrophe bond investors. For each
default event, we noted the cause, the catastrophe
bond that was primarily affected, the capital at risk,
the expected loss, and the percentage of loss of cap-
ital invested by catastrophe bond investors.4
Finally, we obtained catastrophe model docu-
mentation for the state of Florida (USA), the region
that has been covered most extensively via catas-
trophe bonds over the years. Florida oversees the
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3 Rating agencies typically rate catastrophe bonds at
speculative (“junk bond”) grade. StandardandPoor’s (2013:
16) provides the following rationale: “Natural catastrophes
can occur at any moment and depending on the peril,
without warning, resulting in a default or ratings down-
grade. Therefore, based on our credit stability criteria . . .we
typically cap the nat-cat risk factor and, thus, the rating on a
single-event natural peril catastrophe bond at ‘bb1’ and
‘BB1’, respectively.”
4 As noted earlier, not all natural catastrophes result
in losses to bondholders. This is because some areas are
underinsured or because the insured losses are covered
directly by the risk held by the insurer and the reinsurer.
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accuracy and reliability of catastrophe models used
in the state by stipulating that catastrophe model
vendors submit detailed documentation on how
they generated their models and model output to
Florida’s Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection
Methodology (Weinkle & Pielke Jr., 2017). These
documents, spanning hundreds of pages each, were
generated annually by the modeling firms RMS,
CoreLogic,andAIRWorldwide,andbythe International
Hurricane Research Center at Florida International
University. We downloaded them from Florida’s
State Board of Administration’s website.5
ANALYSIS
Sociologists of finance study the role of financial
models in shaping markets and market behavior
(Carruthers & Kim, 2011). A point of emphasis is that
financial models may not only capture and reflect ag-
gregate market activity but can also shape transactions
and become performative. In his highly influential
book, MacKenzie (2006) captures this insight by using
two metaphors. In the camera metaphor, models are
merely devices that help understand the reality of what
transpires in markets. They are simplified mathemati-
cal representations of market processes and produce
knowledge. Just like the machineries of knowing stud-
iedbyKnorr-Cetina (1999: 286), theyplayapart in goals
of “anticipation, identification, and calculation.” In the
engine metaphor, by contrast, the theorization that un-
derlies models also shapes what happens in markets.
This striking role reversal draws on performativity the-
ory (Austin, 1976; Marti & Gond, 2018) and provides
a conceptual foundation that allows analysts to un-
derstandanddescribeprocesses throughwhichmodels
of markets become self-fulfilling (MacKenzie & Millo,
2003). According to both metaphors, models corre-
spondwith reality, either because they faithfully record
market behavior or because they encourage market ac-
tors to behave in accordance with theory.
Our analysis proceeds by examiningwhether either
of the two metaphors is applicable to catastrophe
models. We start by assessing their precision and
historical accuracy, thus testingwhether they function
as cameras. We then assess whether the engine meta-
phor is apt, by examining how catastrophemodels are
revised and what effects these revisions have on
markets.
Are Catastrophe Bonds Cameras?
To assess whether catastrophe bonds can be un-
derstood as cameras that capture risk, we examine two
distinct yet related questions. First, we explore
whether they are precise. Do they provide forecasts
with a level of specificity that is useful on decision-
making? Second, we explore whether they are accu-
rate. Do the forecasts they provide correspondwith the
historical record? Put differently, the question about
precision deals with confidence intervals, and the
question about accuracy deals with point estimates.
To analyze precision, we use data from the Florida
Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection. In 2013,
the commission provided modelers a set of parame-
ters defining a hypothetical hurricane and asked to
see the modeling results. Figure 3 is an example of a
scenario used in risk models, revealing their linear
design. The panel on the left focuses on meteoro-
logical risk and predicts the occurrence, intensity,
and movement of hurricanes. The panel on the right
focuses on the physical damages caused by the hur-
ricane and rebuilding costs. Each of the boxes in the
flowchart depicts rather elaborate submodels.6 For
example, the submodel for hurricane severity uses a
Poisson distribution to calculate storm frequency, a
Gaussian distribution to calculate inland filling rate
(a measure of storm decay), a lognormal distribution
for maximum wind speed, a truncated lognormal
distribution for calculating the radius of maximum
wind speeds, and gammadistributions for additional
wind parameters. The submodel for incremental
damage factors assumes proportions of different
types of structures (wood frame, masonry, mobile
home, and concrete), places them at the centroid of
eachzip code in the state, andexamines the impact of
wind speed on their integrity, whereas ignoring ap-
purtenance structures and contents. These and other
simplifications throughout themodeling processmake
calculations tractable.
Notably, confidence intervals are presented only for
very fewmodel components. One component is wind
speed, as portrayed and explained in Figure 4. It re-
veals a confidence interval of roughly 650 percent as
regards the effect of just one factor, wind speed, on
financial losses. Even this limited information
about confidence intervals is revelatory, however.
As emphasized earlier (particularly in Figure 3),
catastrophe models are sequential. Consequently,
confidence intervals that are output from one sub-
model generate larger confidence intervals in sub-
sequent phases. This is because mathematically
confidence intervals propagate through subsequent
calculations. In otherwords, if there is a big error term
in one variable in a formula, then it ismathematically
straightforward to demonstrate that the outcome has
5 https://www.sbafla.com/method/ModelerSubmissions/
PreviousYearsModelSubmissions.aspx
6 Detailed descriptions of the other sub-models are
available in the files posted on the Florida’s State Board of
Administration website.
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to have at least the same size of error (Clifford, 1973;
Hoffman & Hammonds, 1994). And indeed Florida
documentation reveals large confidence intervals in
theprojectedcosts, in somecasesmore thana factor of
10 (Table 1). In sum, although catastrophe models
generate a point estimate for catastrophe losses, these
estimates are accompaniedbyerrorbars that canbean
order of magnitude larger. Catastrophe models are
imprecise. Ifwecompare themwithcameras, then the
image they provide is very fuzzy.
FIGURE 3
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Note: Source: AIR Worldwide (2017). Copyright © 2017 AIR Worldwide. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.
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How accurate are catastrophe models? The pri-
mary output of catastrophe models, as regards catastro-
phebondpricing, is knownas theexpected loss, defined
as theaverage loss that investors canexpect to incurover
the course of a period (usually one year) divided by the
principalamount invested.Amoreintuitivemetric is the
probability of attachment, defined as the likelihood that
a catastrophe bond will suffer some losses over the
course of a one-year period (Willis Capital Markets &
Advisory, 2015). Both are listed in the prospectuses for
catastrophe bonds and are given as a percentage.
Of course, to theextent that thesepercentages arenot
0 or 100, they can never be inaccurate. This charac-
teristic is true of all forecasts and encountered most
frequently in the quotidian weather forecast. A typical
meteorological forecast will predict, e.g., a 30 percent
chance of rain and of coursewill be correct, regardless
ofwhether it rains or not—a binary outcome—on that
specific day. It is only when aggregating sequences of
predictions that forecast accuracy can be assessed.
Themethod for doing so is intuitive. Continuing with
the rain example, over a long enoughperiod of time, if
we tabulate the number of days in which a forecaster
predicted a 30 percent chance of rain, then perfect
accuracy implies that the percentage of days inwhich
it did in fact rain should be precisely 30 percent.
To date, more than 600 catastrophe tranches have
been issued, allowing us to assess forecast accuracy of
this statistical population. Figure 5 is a histogram
of probabilities of attachment, revealing that the major-
ity have probabilities of attachment less than 5
percent.
Of these bonds, a mere 10 have been triggered (see
Table 2). Although this might be surprising at the first
glance, given that catastrophe bonds cover regionswith
high likelihood of catastrophe, it is worth remembering
that the bonds are triggered only when losses are large.
For example, only two of the nine outstanding catas-
trophe bonds covering the Gulf of Mexico triggered be-
cause of hurricane Katrina in 2005. And in fact, 4 of the
10 bonds listed in Table 2 were triggered because of
insolvency of the special purpose vehicle run by
Lehman Brothers as a consequence of the global finan-
cial crisis,7 leaving only 6 bonds thatwere triggered as a
result of natural catastrophe.
Figure6presents a reliability diagram, or attributes
diagram (Hsu & Murphy, 1986), in which the ob-
served frequency of triggers is plotted against the
forecast probability. In this graph, we chose to divide the
range of forecast probabilities into bins of 1 percent. The
diagonal on theplot constitutes a reference line of perfect
forecasting accuracy. This line represents an ideal situa-
tion inwhich thepercentageof catastrophes forecasted to
occur at a certain probability is observed at precisely the
number of times equivalent to that percentage. The far-
ther the actual observations (the points on the graph) are
from this line, the less reliable the forecasts that were
made. The figure reveals that the observed catastrophe
frequencies were somewhat lower than predictions, par-
ticularly for forecasts thatpredictedahighprobabilityofa
catastrophe. In other words, catastrophe models over-
estimated the probability that catastrophes would occur,
particularly catastrophes that were modeled as riskier.
An established method for assessing forecast ac-
curacy was developed by Brier (1950), and is known











where ft is the probability that was forecast, ot is the
actual observedoutcome (0 if it doesnot occur and1 if
it does), andN is the number of forecasting instances.
In essence, the Brier score is simply themean squared
FIGURE 4
Projected Effect of Wind Speed on Financial Losses
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Note: Source: Risk Management Solutions (2013). Copyright ©
2013 Risk Management Solutions, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reprintedwith permission.As explained in the accompanying text,
“each point represents the average annual loss per $1,000 of expo-
sure for a ZIP Code.Vmax is set to “low” and “high” values to obtain
alternate loss costs, which are compared with the original losses.
The 5 percent and 95 percent confidence bounds on the Vmax CDF
[sic – Cumulative Distribution Function] are used to set the “low”
and “high” limits . . . The blue (purple) points show the ratio of
alternate to original loss costs when Vmax is set to “low” (“high”)
versus the loss cost resulting from the original modeled Vmax.”
To access the interactive data visualization for
Table 2, click here.
7 A subsidiary of the investment bank, Lehman Brothers
Special Financing, acted as total-return swap counterparty
for a number of transactions, which subsequently defaul-
ted because of their inability tomaintain interest payments
and return full principal after Lehman failed.
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error of the forecast (Winkler, 1996). The Brier score
ranges from0 to1,with0being aperfect score. For our
dataset, theBrier score is0.01,whichat the first glance
suggests very good predictive power. However, be-
cause of the way it is constructed, the Brier score
tends to yield a good score when applied to rare
events, such as catastrophes (Winkler, 1994).
One solution to remedy this bias is the Brier skill
score, derived from theBrier score (Bradley, Schwartz,
&Hashino, 2008;Wilks, 2006). Like theBrier score, the
Brier skill score too originates in meteorological fore-
casting. It assesses the quality of prediction as com-
pared with a constant base rate, usually climatology.
Assume, e.g., a place in which precisely half the days
each year, and every year, are rainy. In this place, the
climatologybase rate for rain is50percent.A forecaster
could simply predict a 50 percent chance of rain in
each day and obtain a reasonably good Brier score, but
this forecaster does not provide any meteorological
expertise, or “resolution” (Murphy, 1973), and does
not attempt to distinguish one day from the other. The
Brier skill score assesses the quality of meteorological
skill as compared with the climatological base rate,
rewarding forecasters that attempt to make sharper, or
more meaningful, predictions than climatology. Its
formula is as follows:
TABLE 1
Uncertainty Intervals in Loss Levels
Return Period (Years) Estimated Loss Level Uncertainty Interval









Source: Risk Management Solutions (2008). Note the magnitude of the uncertainty intervals in larger and rarer events. For more frequent
and less damaging events, the magnitude of the uncertainty is smaller, but the ratio between the high end of the uncertainty interval and the
low end is proportionately larger.
FIGURE 5
Distribution of Probabilities of Attachment in the Dataset
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Note: Notation of the X-axis: [a; b[ implies a bin that contains all bonds with a probability of attachment equal to or greater than a and less
than b.





where BSreference is the Brier score attained via con-
sistently forecasting the climatological baseline.
Brier skill scores range fromnegative infinity to 1, the
latter being a perfect score. A skill score of 0 implies
no meteorological skill, equivalent to selecting the
climatological base rate for each individual forecast.
Using our database, we can easily calculate the
baseline BSreference: we simply divide the number of
bonds triggered by the number of forecasts made,
i.e., 6/546 5 0.9 percent. The resulting Brier skill
score is 1 – 0.01/0.009 5 –0.11. This score implies
that for the entire set of catastrophe bond pre-
dictions, the skill of prediction is worse than using
the 0.9 percent base rate for each and every forecast.
Consistent with Figure 6, the number of extreme
events predicted is higher than the number of ex-
treme events that actually occur. In other words, for
all themodelingwork that is done to substantiate the
business of catastrophe bonds, they do not have de-
monstrably accurate predictive power.
Simulating accuracy. As a complementary ap-
proach to assessing model accuracy, we simulated
model performance by means of the catastrophe
bond data we collected and, in particular, the pa-
rameter “probability of attachment”—the probabil-
ity that the bond will be triggered. In catastrophe
models, the event frequency of catastrophe natural
events is modeled with a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process (Chang, Lin, & Yu, 2011; Dassios & Jang,
2003; Jaimungal & Wang, 2006), where events hap-
pen continuously and independently of one another





where PðkÞ is the probability of attachment, k is the
number of events, and l is the event rate. To create a
simulation, one first must find the value l that de-
termines thePoissondistribution for eachcatastrophe
bond in the sample. We begin by recognizing that the
probability of the bond being triggered is equal to one
minus the probability of the bond not being triggered




  5   e2 l: (4)
Then, the probability of any event taking place
is pðk. 0Þ5 12pð0Þ5 12 e2 l .
Transforming yields l5 2 lnð12pðk. 0ÞÞ. In our
case, as we are interested in one triggering event per
catastrophe bond, k5 1, and thus,
l5 2 lnð12pð1ÞÞ: (5)
Our dataset contains the probability attachment for
eachcatastrophebond (p(1)), allowingus to solve forl.
After obtaining the value of l for each of the bonds
in our dataset, we constructed 1,000 simulated his-
tories of all of these bonds.Weused the value of l that
we calculated to generate random Poisson distribu-
tions to determine whether each bond was triggered
in each of these simulated histories. We then aggre-
gated all the bonds in each simulated run to calcu-
late the average number of triggered events and losses
over our entire simulation. Results are presented in
Figure 7A and 7B and are consistent with our Brier
score analysis, which also revealed that forecasts are
overlypessimistic, comparedwith actual events. This
result reinforces our assessment that if catastrophe
models are cameras, they are of poor quality.
Are Catastrophe Models Engines?
In this part of our analysis, we explore the possi-
bility that catastrophemodels are engines. The engine
metaphor implies that changes in the theorization
that underlies the models generate corresponding
changes in how market actors price the financial in-
struments predicated on these models. Catastrophe
risk modelers, of course, continuously refine and
update theirmodels, as new science is developed and
additional data become available for calibration.
Implicit in these improvements—but rarelystated—is
an acceptance of the fact that prior models suffered
from inaccuracy. But, to assess whether catastrophe
models are engines, we first need to understand the
contexts in which the models are modified and then
explore the consequences of these modifications.
We have been unable to ascertain how frequently
such modifications occur or to determine the magni-
tude of forecast changes that they generate, but we did
identify two time periods when major model updates
occurred. The first was in 2007, following Hurricane
Katrina. A report from Lane Financial LLC, a consul-
ting firm in the reinsurance sector, describes the hur-
ricane’s effects on catastrophe modelers as follows:
Katrina had caused a great deal of loss and a
great deal of statistical-model soul searching.
Had the models been sufficiently accurate in
allowing for a storm of Katrina’s intensity? The
upshot was an extensive model revision by all
three modeling companies during 2006. That is,
by AIRWorldwide, EQECAT and RMS. They all
adopted a similar convention to capture their re-
evaluation of the risk—they produced long term
probabilities and introduced short term (or
sensitivity) probabilities for certain risks and
let the investors choose which to believe. (Lane
& Beckwith, 2007: 3)
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Whereas in 2007 all three central modelers in-
troduced revisions following a costly catastrophic
event, in 2011, RMS acted independently to refine
its model. In February of that year, RMS changed
the storm surge component in its model and also
predicted an increase in hurricane activity due to
warmer oceanic waters. The rationales for these
changes, and their effect, were captured in the fol-
lowing quote:
Prior to the changes, RMS’s model results were
frequently included in cat bond offerings’ pro-
spectuses. Since the model change, however,
RMS results have not been incorporated in U.S.
hurricanecatbonds.AIRWorldwidehascaptured
that business. Its model has reflected warmer sea-
surface temperatures since 2007, looking at his-
torical average hurricane rates during periods
of elevated sea-surface temperatures since 1900.
RMS’s is more forward-looking, predicting in-
creasingly frequent and powerful hurricanes and
subsequently larger losses and cat-bond payouts.
(Hintze, 2013)
In the same interview, the managing director of
RMShimself cautioned that themodels his company
provides are in fact indeterminate because “proving
statistical validity requires 100 or more years of
supporting data.” Notwithstanding these acknowl-
edgments of the limited predictive power of models,
and the frequent changes they undergo, the models
continue to be the basis of all catastrophe bond
offerings.
Catastrophe risk modelers clearly take great pains
to revisit and hone their modeling techniques, in an
effort to improve their predictive power. Given this
effort, one could reasonably assume that over time,
the linkage betweenmodeled losses (potential costs)
and catastrophe bond spreads (potential benefits)
would tighten. In other words, increasingly accurate
modeling should translate into some measures of fi-
nancial certitude, in an ongoing process of financial
theory informing financial practice.We examine this
postulate in the following paragraph.
What drives catastrophe bond pricing? Roughly
two decades ago, when catastrophe bonds were first
emerging, the yields they provided investors were
described as “juicy” (Stovin-Bradford, 2015), offer-
ing investors a yield spread approximately twice
the magnitude of equally rated corporate bonds
(Dieckmann, 2011). One of the first bonds, issued
by Residential Re, was approximately three times
oversubscribed and closed at a price providing in-
vestors a return nine times greater than expected loss
(Froot, 2001). The bond was not triggered. One ex-
planation put forth for these puzzlingly lavish ratios
was that the new, unfamiliar asset class necessitated
particularly generous return rates to attract potential
investors characterized by “ambiguity aversion,
myopic loss aversion, and fixed costs of education”
(Bantwal & Kunreuther, 2000: 88).
Over time, these spreads have fluctuated but today
are on aggregate roughly the same as 20 years ago.
Figure 8A shows this progression. It also reveals that
large fluctuations in spread (red line) occur after
catastrophic events, both natural and financial.
Spreads spiked in the aftermath of Katrina in 2005
and again following the 2008 financial crisis. A
smaller fluctuation occurred after the Fukushima
earthquake and tsunami of 2011, following which
one bond defaulted. At the same time, the mean ex-
pected loss has been stable over these past two de-
cades (blue line).
Internal dynamics of the insurance market ex-
plain how these spreads can be volatile, whereas
expected loss remains stable. Reinsurance con-
stantly cycles between “hard” and “soft” markets.
Hardmarkets appear after large loss events,when the
entire industry experiences a liquidity crunch fol-
lowing a high number of payouts to customer claims
(Johnson, 2014). Conversely, soft markets occur after
years when payouts have been lower than expected,
easing the pressure on insurance premiums and ca-
tastrophe bond yields. Figure 8A reveals that catas-
trophe bonds follow precisely this dynamic. Cedents
offer higher return rates in hard markets to obtain
capital to make payouts. In other words, higher
spreads are not at all related to changes in expected
losses or in the underlying catastrophe risk models.
FIGURE 6
Catastrophe Bond Reliability Diagram
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FIGURE 7
(A) Number of Defaults, 1,000 Simulated Histories; (B) Losses, 1,000 Simulated Histories
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FIGURE 8
(A) Performance of the Cat Bond Market (Yearly Mean Values); (B) Catastrophe Bond and Similarly Rated
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Also apparent from Figure 8A is a pattern of siz-
able and consistent growth in the catastrophe bond
market (ochre area), except for a dip following the
financial crisis, an event unrelated to the natural
catastrophe risk. Growth was so substantial that by
2013, the market had flipped from a buyers’ market
to a sellers’ market. Catastrophe bond offerings
had routinely become oversubscribed, and yield
spreads declined correspondingly. Coupon rates
were priced in the bottom of the range that was
suggested during roadshows, at times coming in
even below the range (Fitch Reinsurance, 2014).
This, in turn, put downward pressure on traditional
reinsurance offerings, to the consternation of
Warren Buffet and others.
“Mr. Buffett used to brag about the scale and prof-
itability of the [reinsurance] business.At last year’s
Berkshire annualmeeting,Mr. Buffett complained
to shareholders that reinsurance has become ‘a
fashionable asset class.’ Faced with lower prices
and poor returns, Berkshire is doing fewer deals.
Mr. Ehrhart, the Aon executive, says he used to
call the profit squeeze ‘the battle of six and 16.’
Reinsurers historically aimed for returns of 16
percent a year. The pension funds snapping up cat
bonds are happy with just 6 percent.” (Scism &
Das, 2016).
Indeed, over time, as catastrophe bonds have be-
come more mainstream, their spread has come to
closely resemble thatof similarly ratedcorporatebonds
(see Figure 8B). In soft markets, they too now tack to
broader economic conditions and availability of capi-
tal, albeit at a premium, driven apparently by investor
belief that corporate bonds are, unlike catastrophe
bonds, immune to total loss (Lane & Beckwith, 2002).
These three influences—macroeconomic condi-
tions, liquidity in the insurance industry, and the
meeting of supply and demand—are in no way re-
velatory. They are vitally important to consider,
however, because they show that the factors that have
been driving catastrophe bond pricing over the past
20 years are not an outcome of financial theorization,
despite the sophistication of catastrophe modeling.
Movements in prices are driven by mundane eco-
nomic forces. Catastrophemodels, unlike derivatives
(MacKenzie & Millo, 2003), are not engines.
IMPLICATIONS
“It’s crazy that we’ve only [got data] for 40 years
and talk about one-in-500 year return periods.
How the fuck am I supposed to know [whether a
model is accurate]?” (Anonymous reinsurer,
quoted in Jarzabkowski et al., 2015: 79).
Our analysis has demonstrated, at length, several
points worth reiterating. First, catastrophe models do
not predict extreme events better than guesswork.
Second, catastrophe models evolve as the underlying
science improves, yet nonetheless do not become de-
monstrably more accurate. And third, the returns that
theyprovide investors are driven largely by exogenous
economic factors, rather than by the catastrophe risk
which underlies the bond. Perhaps, it is no surprise
that in the insurance industry many see catastrophe
models as “useless” (Jarzabkowski et al., 2015: 79).
Is such a conclusion warranted, however? Not-
withstanding their shortcomings, the logic of the
models and the math that underlies these bonds are,
in fact, thoughtful and plausibly correct. Because the
variables in the formulas are not known with pre-
cision, a “good”model may actually have very little
predictive power because it has extremely large
confidence intervals. Consequently, over a horizon
of several years, catastrophe models simply cannot
be wrong. “[Catastrophe] models perform a peculiar
epistemological magic. Because their object exists
only in the probabilistic future, they are never ab-
solutely falsifiable—yet by the same token, they can
always be improved via the incorporation of new
observations and science.” (Johnson, 2015: 2511).
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to question whether
improvements attained through incorporation of new
observations and science will substantively increase
predictive power.Modeling challenges are expected to
increase as the world heats (Surminski, Bouwer, &
Linnerooth-Bayer, 2016). These challenges arise for
two reasons.The first is a violationof the assumption of
stationarity, which underlies catastrophe models.
When invoking stationarity, modelers assume that the
statistical distribution of events in the past will remain
constant moving forward (Milly et al., 2008; Temple,
2017). Stationarity underpins the appropriateness of
using historical events to calibrate and validate climate
models. And yet, evidence suggests that hurricane
(Emanuel, 2017), forest fire (Abatzoglou & Williams,
2016; Turco et al., 2018), and flooding (Alfieri et al.,
2017) incidents in a warmer world will differ consid-
erably from past patterns.
A second, evengreater challenge tomodeling arises
when acknowledging that climatic patterns may tip.
Whereas catastrophe models have focused to date
on regions that are particularly prone to storms and
droughts, extreme weather patterns may shift dra-
matically on a warmer planet. Unprecedented ex-
tremeevents catch insurersunprepared.For example,
a “gray swan” wildfire hit Fort McMurray and its
environs in 2016, causing $3B in insurance damages.
At the time, actuaries believed thatwildfire risk in the
area was nonexistent, and it was not factored into
premiums. Maurice Tulloch, the chief executive of
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Aviva PLC’s international insurance division, said:
“The previous models wouldn’t have envisioned it.”
(Hope & Friedman, 2018). Climatologists are now
attempting to forecast sui generis events such as the
advent of gray swan tropical cyclones: high-impact
storms that have no historical precedent but are
foreseeable by integrating theories from climate
physics with historical data patterns. Gray swan ty-
phoons have recently been deemed plausible in the
Persian Gulf, a region where extreme storms have
never been recorded, but which climatologists say
may become increasingly likely as the planet warms
(Lin & Emanuel, 2016). At this level of ignorance and
uncertainty, insurers and financiers would likely be
loath to attempt to place a monetary value on the
likelihood and damages of such a disaster.
Overall, inasmuch as modelers accumulate knowl-
edge and improve their modeling, these efforts may be
overshadowed by rapid climatological shifts and the
forecasting uncertainty that they generate. It is unclear
whether the “cameras” that future modelers will de-
velopwill be any less indeterminate than current ones.
There appears to be an upper bound on the capacity of
modeling and risk management to reduce uncertainty
when it comes to costly, rare events.
The Role of Ignorance
Interestingly, actors in the catastrophe bond mar-
ket are under no illusion about their accuracy. John
Seo, a hedge fund manager who was instrumental in
establishing the catastrophe bond market, has sug-
gested that bond prices “didn’t need to be exactly
right, just sort of right” (Lewis, 2007: 626). In the
world of catastrophe bonds, as in statistics, the aph-
orism “allmodels arewrong, someareuseful,” seems
to apply. Actors use models that are state-of-the-art
yet inaccurate, built from highly sophisticated ex-
pertise yet yielding indeterminacy, acknowledged as
flawed, yet indispensable for market transactions to
occur.
If ontological certainty, in finance, takes a back seat
to utility, this begs the question of what utility exactly
catastrophe models provide. One possibility is that ca-
tastrophe models do not directly determine value, but
they do help in other ways. In particular, they may be
used even whenmodel users dislike or are skeptical of
them, if not least for the coordination and communi-
cation affordances they provide (MacKenzie & Spears,
2014a), to“enable tradability” (Davis&Kim,2015:207).
If this is true, thenmarket actors who initiate, buy, and
sell catastrophe bonds create a social arrangement that
accepts, and is indeed founded on, ignorance that is
irreducible (Faber, Manstetten, & Proops, 1992).
This tentative proposition is aligned with research
in the emerging interdisciplinary field of agnotology,
or the study of ignorance (Croissant, 2014; McGoey,
2012a, 2012b; Proctor, 2008; Rescher, 2009). One of
agnotology’s central claims is that ignorance is not
necessarily something to be eradicated, and may in
some instances be useful. In particular, ignorance can
help get things done. Ignorance can help us “see”
things clearly, as in the case of blind auditions for
musicians (Goldin & Rouse, 2000). Similarly, blind
reviews for academic articles help observers focus on
themost salient aspects ofwhat theyneed to evaluate.
Purposeful ignorance is equivalent to the conscious
unburdening of the weight of heuristics and accu-
mulated wisdom, and can yield improved outcomes.
Driving this point to its logical conclusion,
Smithson (2008: 221) argued that expertise and
particularly specialization is a “social ignorance
arrangement.” Specialization distributes expertise
across populations, concentrating narrow domains
of knowledge among certain groups while at the
same time expanding the ignorance of nonexperts.
In catastrophe modeling, as expertise in hazard,
engineering, and economic models becomes more
technical and intricate, so too does the ignorance of
managers, investors, regulators, and other evalua-
tors of this expertise. Nonspecialists willfully be-
come more ignorant, commensurately more reliant
on the expertise of specialists, less aware of un-
derlying assumptions and nuance (Knorr-Cetina,
1999; MacKenzie, 1996). And yet, because the logic
of relying on specialization to increase knowledge
is compelling, the resultant social arrangement is
sustained.
Notably, social arrangements of willful ignorance
appear to inform the evaluation cultures that shape
trading decisions in financial markets (Lange, 2016;
MacKenzie & Spears, 2014b). These arrangements
seem to induce market actors to transact without a
full comprehension of the risks involved, a dynamic
that appears tohavebeenat play in the2008 financial
crisis (MacKenzie, 2011). The expert knowledge re-
quired toparsemortgage-backed securitiesmayhave
led to traders not understanding them fully (Ghent,
Torous, & Valkanov, 2014), even though they could
have (and some did) (Fligstein & Goldstein, 2010).
However, in catastrophe bonds, even if one masters
the math and the jargon, ignorance cannot be eradi-
cated. If this is indeed the case, it is worthwhile
considering the implications that may derive from
theuse of catastrophebonds andother financial tools
to promote sustainable development.
Ignorance and Value Capture
Our analysis suggests that, to date, catastrophe
bonds have been placed at price points that disfa-
vor the end users of insurance products. Surplus
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revenues have made their way to catastrophe bond
investors because the number of bonds triggered has
been lower thanpredictedby themodels.Although it
is impossible to determine whether this is a result of
modeling flaws, biases, or the stochastic manner
in which catastrophes have occurred, clearly these
rents have not been channeled into efforts toward
addressing the SDGs. The monetary rewards of ig-
norance have, so far, trickled up, not down.
Clearly, it is quite plausible that in the future, bonds
will be triggered more frequently and will provide
much needed succor to claimants in dire straits.8
Were this to occur, it would appear to be an example
of financialization contributing directly to social
welfare. It is far from certain, however, whether in-
stitutional investors would remain invested in catas-
trophe bonds if they were to begin triggering more
frequently.Aswehaveshown, institutional investors’
ongoing interest in catastrophe risk is not entirely
unrelated to the confluence of economic conditions
following the 2008 financial crisis. A heady mix of
low interest rates, high cash reserves, and a good ini-
tial track-record that provided superlative returns has
attracted investors with higher risk appetites and
leveraged assets, suggesting increased speculative,
rather than insurance interest in these instruments
(Cohn, 2014), and leading some to worry about a
bubble in the catastrophe bondmarket. In any case, if
new entry and competitive pressures continue to re-
duce spreads, investors are likely to seek returns
elsewhere, quite possibly in domains unrelated to
sustainability. All told, the social benefit attainable
through harnessing financial innovation to manage
extreme risk may well be fleeting, or even illusory.
Our conclusions thus beg the question of whether
financial innovation is an appropriate avenue for tack-
ling the most uncertain of hazards likely to materialize
in an increasingly unstable planetary environment. It is
unclear whether insurers, regulators, and the general
public should continue to place their confidence in fi-
nancial solutions that are predicated on infrequent
events and low interest rates. Catastrophe bonds are
increasingly used at the sovereign level in developing
economies such as Turkey, across the Caribbean, and
in Mexico (Ghesquiere & Mahul, 2010; Marsh &
McLennan, 2018). With the returns that bonds cover-
ing these economies provide, it is important to ensure
that they reduce precarity, rather than increasing it.
Other Tools
Of course, other avenues for reducing risk and pro-
viding post-catastrophe aid do exist. In the context of
disaster response,whichisnotoriouslyhaphazardand
inefficient, the assistance provided by governments
and aid organizations is often slower than desired
(Ballesteros, Useem, & Wry, 2017). But this does not
mean that governments and societies are best served
by increasing their reliance on market actors. One al-
ternative set of solutions involves betterpreparation in
the form of scenario planning, preemptive financial
allocations, andde-politizationofdisaster relief efforts
(Clarke & Dercon, 2016). Collaboration between gov-
ernment and the private sector also seems to be a
promising approach. An example is Flood Re: a part-
nership between the U.K. government and insurers
through which reinsurance is subsidized by a tax
levied on all insurers that offer home insurance in the
country (Christophers, 2019).
In addition to risk transfer, financial tools that pro-
mote risk reduction can also be used, following the
maxim that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure. Preemptive constructionof infrastructure that
will reduce the impact of rising sea levels and higher
storm surges will reduce future rebuilding costs
(Mechler et al., 2014).Financial engineeringcanmake
such investments attractive. The so-called resilience
bonds would allow a city, e.g., to arrange for an in-
surance company toprovide financing to buildhigher
seawalls to prevent flooding. A seawall would reduce
thepremium that an insurance companydemands for
covering the city’s catastrophe risk, and freeing funds
from the city’s budgetary line item would allow it to
spend the money for construction (Ruggeri, 2017).
TheWorld Resources Institute has developed a forest
resilience bond, which takes capital from private in-
vestors and invests it in forest restoration to reduce the
risk of wildfire (Koren, 2018). Beneficiaries pay in-
vestors back over time from the savings expected to
accrue as fires and the damage they leave behind both
decline. As these and other forms of financial in-
novation become available, it is important to assess
which suites of products most effectively promote
desirable planetary and social outcomes.
CONCLUSION: FINANCING THE SDGS
The promise and perils associated with catastrophe
bonds are not unlike those associated with other
8 Our data collection ended in 2016, before the high-
profile catastrophes of 2017 (Hurricanes Irma, Harvey, and
Maria and others) and 2018 (California wildfires) had oc-
curred. As many as 19 separate CAT bond tranches may
have been triggered, yet losses are still not known, because
many insurance claims remain unresolved. At the time of
writing, $1.05 billion in outstanding issuance is vulnerable
to losses (Artemis, 2019a), revised from an initial $1.4
billion from 2017 alone (Polacek, 2018). At the same time,
new CAT bond issuance in 2018 reached $13.9 billion,
rivaling 2017’s record year of $12.6 billion, and Q1 2019
$2.8 billion issuance was the second most active Q1 in the
market’s history (Artemis, 2019b, 2019c).
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financial innovation associated with the SDGs. For
example, Sullivan and Hannis (2017) describe a form
of financial innovation known as biodiversity off-
setting. It allows developers that create “unavoidable”
harm through habitat destruction to compensate for
these impacts by paying for an “equivalent” amount
of habitat conservation elsewhere. Potentially, future
markets will allow actors to trade in “biodiversity
units.” On other fronts, social impact bonds are finan-
cial instruments in which investors provide capital to
nonprofit organizations that deliver social programs,
such as reducing recidivism and providing special
needs education (Knowledge@Wharton, 2012). If the
nonprofit meets predefined metrics, the government
reduces the long-term cost of public services and can
thereby pay investors back, plus a return. If the non-
profit fails in meeting its objectives, the investors get
no repayment.
There is no shortage of reasons to find these fi-
nancial innovationsobjectionable. Fromanormative
perspective, they demand that individuals and so-
cieties tackle uncomfortable questions regarding the
dividing line between the sacred and the profane,
morals, and markets (Zelizer, 1979). Just because
habitats and catastrophes can be transformed into
tradable units, does not mean that they have to be.
Other possibilities exist, although perhaps they are
increasingly difficult to imagine in societies dominated
by markets (Davis, 2009).
To the extent that financial innovation is encour-
aged, itwould bewise to consider designing tools and
markets in ways that truly encourage sustainable
development and discourage excess profit-making.
Instruments such as catastrophe bonds, social impact
bonds, and biodiversity markets all use intricate
models based on the best available evidence, and yet
their accuracy is hard to discern, particularly in the
short term. Moreover, they are offered to institutional
investors and are not traded via open markets. These
attributes make them less than ideal candidates for
informed, inclusive trading, which thrives on fric-
tionless transactions in information rich environ-
ments (Zuckerman, 2010). If financial innovations are
to be used for tackling the SDGs, wewould argue that
it is particularly important for them to be designed
robustly, with mechanisms that incentivize actors to
truly create social value. Improving transparency and
accessibility, while not a panacea, can allow actors
with complementary sources of expertise to enter
these markets and influence the social outcomes
they generate.
Financial innovation may not be effective every-
where and should not be deployed haphazardly. It
can create the greatest good when its application is
relatively simple and straightforward, relying more
on common sense than irreducible ignorance.
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